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THE LAw ScHooL.--The faculty has been strengthened this
year by the addition of George E. Osborne. Professor Osborne
was graduated from the University of California in 1916, receiv-
ing the A. B. degree, and from Harvard Law School in 1919,
where he took his LL. B., followed by that of S. J. D. in 1920.
He came to Minnesota from the Law School of the University of
West Virginia, where, in addition to his duties as assistant pro-
fessor of law he was editor-in-chief of the West Virginia Law
Quarterly. While at Harvard he was president of the law review
editorial board.
The registration in the Law School is somewhat larger than
last year, the total being 297 as against 269. The freshman class
is 153, compared with 119 in 1920-21.
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TAXATION-STATE TAX ON NATIONAL BANK STOcK.-The
power of the states to tax national bank stocks rests upon the per-
missive legislation of Congress, and a state tax in excess of and
not in conformity with such legislation is void.' This permissive
legislation is found in section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States which provides that state taxation "shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens" of the state. The main purpose of
Congress in so limiting state taxation was "to render it impossible
for the state, in levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal
and unfriendly competition, by favoring institutions or individuals
carrying on a similar business and operations and investments of
like character" to those engaged in by national banks. 2 It is to be
noted that the prohibition is not specifically confined to discrimi-
nation between national and state banks. The language of section
5219 is much broader. It prohibits discrimination against national
banks and in favor of moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens." While the term "moneyed capital" perhaps has not been
exhaustively defined, it nevertheless has come to have a well es-
tablished meaning of a fairly comprehensive extent. It does not
include stock in corporations not competing with banks but it does
include something more than shares in banking corporations. In
the leading case4 on this phase of the subject it is said that "mon-
eyed capital" includes "shares . . . in all enterprises in which the
capital employed in carrying on its business is money, where the
object of the business is the making of profit by its use as money,"
and, further, that it "includes money in the hands of individuals
employed in a similar way, invested in loans, or in securities for
the payment of money, either as an investment of a permanent
character, or temporarily with a view to sale or repayment and re-
investment." An early case5 held it to be a prohibited discrimina-
tion where the state permitted a taxpayer to deduct from his
moneyed capital the amount of his bona fide indebtedness and
taxed him upon the remainder but denied him the privilege of de-
'Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, (1899) 173 U. S. 664, 19 S.
C. R. 537, 43 L. Ed. 850.2Mercantile National Bank v. New York, (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 7 S. C.
R. 826, 30 L. Ed. 895.8Boyer v. Boyer, (1885) 113 U. S. 689, 5 S. C. R. 706, 28 L. Ed. 1089.4Mercantile National Bank v. New York, (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 157,
7 S. C. R. 826, 30 L. Ed. 895. The rule of construction announced in this
case has been consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court. Amoskeag
Say. Bank v. Purdy, (1913) 231 U. S. 373, 34 S. C. R. 114, 58 L. Ed. 274.5People v. Weaver, (1880) 100 U. S. 539, 24 L. Ed. 705.
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ducting such indebtedness from the value of national bank shares.
The court there points out that the statute has reference to the
entire process of assessment and embraces the valuation of shares
as well as the rate imposed. This case was soon followed by a
series of others to the same effect." An affirmative showing must
be made that the moneyed capital comes into competition with the
business of national banks7 and also that the state taxation dis-
criminates in fact against the holders of shares in national banks.8
In the light of the language of the statute and of the construc-
tion of that language by the Supreme Court it might reasonably
have been expected that the several states would so adjust their
tax programs as not to conflict with the congressional inhibitions.
The recent case of Merchants' National Bank v. Richmondo shows,
however, that at least one state has not done so. The case in-
volved the validity of certain parts of the Virginia tax laws and
briefly was as follows: the rate of taxation on bank stocks (both
state and national) was $1.75 per hundred dollars value while the
rate on bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness (i.e., on
moneyed capital) in the hands of individuals was ninety-five cents
per hundred dollars value There was no discrimination be-
tween state and national banks, as they were classed together and
treated exactly alike. But bank stock was taxed at a greater
rate than moneyed capital and it appeared that the moneyed capi-
tal was competing with the banks in the loan market. On that
state of facts the court held the law to exceed the limits of sec-
tion 5219 and the tax to be void. 10
State laws imposing taxes on national bank stock doubtless
will be examined anew and with closer scrutiny as a result of
this decision. Already there are signs that it is being regarded
with much concern by several states, particularly those which
GSupervisors v. Stanley, (1881) 105 U. S. 305, 26 L. Ed. 1044; Hills v.
National Bank, (1881) 105 U. S. 319, 26 L. Ed. 1052; Evansville National
Bank v. Britton, (1881) 105 U. S. 322, 26 L. Ed. 1053.
7First National Bank of Wellington v. Chapman, (1898) 173 U. S. 205,
219, 19 S. C. R. 407, 43 L. Ed. 669; Commercial Bank v. Chambers, (1901)
182 U. S. 556, 21 S. C. R. 863, 45 L. Ed. 1227.
sAmoskeag Say. Bank v. Purdy, (1913) 231 U. S. 373, 393, 34 S. C. R.
114, 58 L. Ed. 274.
9(1921) 256 U. S. 632, 65 L. Ed. 1131, 41 S. C. R. 619.01n Supervisors v. Stanley, (1881) 105 U. S. 305, 26 L. Ed. 1044, there
is an interesting application of the doctrine that valid parts of a statute
will be saved if they are separable from the invalid. Thus the tax statute
involved in that case was held valid except so far as it did not authorize
a deduction for debts of the shareholder.
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have special taxes on "money and credits." At least two bills 1
have been introduced in the present Congress designed to broad-
en the scope of the congressional permission and thus save the
tax programs of such states as find themselves within the range
of the doctrine reannounced in the Richmond case. Assuming
that the language of the bills is adequate for the purpose intend-
ed, the absence of a retroactive provision makes it doubtful
whether either bill, if passed, would save existing tax programs,
whatever might be the result of its prospective operation.
TORTS-CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT.
-Ever since the law has recognized a property right in the right
of the poor man to labor with his hands,' in the right of a man
to pursue a learned profession,' and in the rights arising out
of contract,3 the courts have labored with the question of how
far and by what means and for what ends this property right
might be invaded without incurring liability. The theory of
tort liability for interfering with contractual relations has grown
to such dimensions that it is impossible to treat the subject in de-
tail here.4 So far as possible the scope of this note will be limit-
ed to interference with existing contract rights, as opposed to
mere contract expectancies.
It is perhaps not safe to say that the tort of enticing away
another's servant has been assimilated to the tort of interfer-
ence with contract rights generally.5 It is probably more cor-
I1IS. 2200, introduced by Senator Nelson, July 1, 1921, providing that
the taxation "shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other
moneyed capital used in banking," and H. R. 8015, introduced by Con-
gressman Volstead, August 1, 1921, providing that the taxation "shall not
be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital similarly
situated and used in banking."
'Butcher's Union, etc. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., (1884) 111 U. S. 746,
757, 4 S. C. R. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; Jones v. Leslie, (1910) 61 Wash. 107,
110, 112 Pac. 81, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 893, and note.2Lawrence v. Briry, (1921) 239 Mass, 424, 132 N. E. 174; Raymer v.
Trefry, (1921) 239 Mass. 410, 132 N. E. 190.3Posner Co. v. Jackson, (1918) 223 N. Y. 325, 332, 119 N. E. 573.4The earliest cases on the subject grew out of the economic situation
in England following the Black Plague and the Statute of Laborers (23
Edw. III.), enacted to cope with it, 27 E. R. C. 106 note, et seq. From
these early cases, the theory of tort liability for inducing breach of con-
tractual obligations has grown until today it embraces the right to contract
freely, as well as existing contract obligations, boycotts, strikes, unfair
competition, picketing, and interference with trades and callings.5Huffcut, Interference with Business in New York, 18 Harvard Law
Review 423-424; 27 E. R. C. 108 note, indicates somewhat the confusion
of the courts on this point.
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rect to say that the latter has developed from the former.6 True
it is today, that in regard to inducing breaches of contract, few
courts draw any distinction between contracts for personal ser-
vice and contracts in general.7
A recent case from the Texas court of civil appeals8 seems
to be an exception to this modern rule. In this case, the defend-
ant willfully and- with knowledge of the contract induced the
promisor to break a contract for the conveyance of real estate
to the plaintiff. The court held, on general demurrer, that the
complaint stated no cause of action, and nonsuited the plaintiff.
The court is not clear in giving the reasons for this result, seem-
ingly resting its decision on the ground that the law will not
interfere where there is an adequate remedy in equity, such as
specific performance.9 It is submitted that this is wrong, as it
should be no answer for a wrongdoer to say that the plaintiff
may have recourse against another in some other or similar action. 10
The remedies should be concurrent or correlative. Did the facts
support such a theory, the decision might be based on the fact that
there was no actual damage. 1 By way of dictum the court seems
to admit that in a proper case, even in the case of a contract relat-
6See note 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 746.
71 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 342, et seq.; 27 E. R. C. 108
note; Beckman v. Marsters, (1907) 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817, 11 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 201, 11 Ann. Cas. 332, exclusive agency contract, injunction
granted; American Malting Co. v. Keitel, (1913) 209 Fed. 351, 359, 126
C. C. A. 277, sale of merchandise, injunction granted; Mealey v. Bemidji
Lumber Co., (1912) 118 Minn. 427, 136 N. W. 1090, logging contract;
Gonzales v. Reichenthaler, (1921) 189 N. Y. S. 783, exclusive contract to
operate a game; Raymond v. Yarrington, (1903) 96 Tex. 443, 73 S. W. 800,
62 L. R. A. 962, agreement not to engage in the business; Temperton v.
Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715, 69 L. T. 78, 41 W. R. 565, contract expectancy
for building material; see note 31 Harvard Law Rev. 1017; Jones v.
Stanley, (1877) 76 N. C. 355, transportation contract; see note 16 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 747; also 27 E. R. C. 109.
sSonnenberg v. Hajek, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 233 S. W. 563.
OThe decision can be best supported, perhaps, on the theory that the
court recognized the equitable property of the plaintiff arising out of the
contract, and that this equitable property remained undamaged by the
conveyance of the land to another who had knowledge of the contract
and induced a breach thereof. That raises the question, can a law court
recognize an equitable property, and if so, can it exercise any discretion in
turning a suitor out of court as it did here, compelling him to proceed in
equity? Even then it does not dispose of the fact that he sued for an
injury to his contract rights, and not for damage to his equitable property.
10 Raymond v. Yarrington, (1903) 96 Tex. 443, 73 S. W. 800, 62 L. R. A.
962.
"Bigelow, Torts, 8th Ed., p. 238, 255, 266, names actual damage as one
of the elements necessary to be proved.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing to real estate, the action would lie ;2 and then intimates further
that in such a case there must be deceit or fraud, or a malicious
purpose. It is elementary that an unlawful means such as fraud
or deceit used to procure a breach of contract will render the
actor liable.' 3 On the other hand it would seem that malice in
the sense of a malevolent motive is not an essential ingredient of
the tort.14 By the weight of modern authority, English and Amer-
ican, if the actor intended the consequences of his act he is liable
unless he can justify. Such willful interference was present in
the instant case.' 5 Another dictum of the court is that it is not
an actionable tort to procure the breach of an unenforceable con-
tract. There is a sharp conflict on this point, but it is believed
that the better authority holds the wrong actionable.16
The rule today seems to be that an intentional or willful in-
terference with the contract right of another renders the actor lia-
ble unless he can justify, and the motive of the actor may, or
may not, be of consequence in determining the sufficiency of the
justification.' 7
12Commenting on Raymond v. Yarrington, (1903) 96 Tex. 443, 73 S. W.
800, 62 L. R. A. 963, the court says, "it is held that a person who interferes
with a contract for the sale of real estate, is liable in damages in a proper
case."
13Huffcut, Interference with Business in New York, 18 Harvard Law
Review 426, et seq.; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 346, 352, et
seq. Indeed, in those courts which do not follow the doctrine of Lumley
v. Gye, (1853) 2 El. & B. 216, the interference is actionable only when the
means used is unlawful; Glencoe Land, etc., Co. v. Hudson Bros. Co.,(1897) 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93, 36 L. R. A. 804; 1 Street, Foundations
of Legal Liability, 346, note 6.
14South Wales Miners' Fed. v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A. C. 239,
53 W. R. 593, 2 Ann. Cas. 436; Twitchell v. Glenwood-Inglewood Co.,(1915) 131 Minn. 375, 155 N. W. 621; Posner Co. v. Jackson, (1918) 223
N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573; Lamb v. Cheney & Son, (1920) 227 N .Y. 418,
125 N. E. 817; Gonzales v. Reichenthaler, (1921) 189 N. Y. S. 783; 49
Solicitor's Journal 666, gives an excellent treatment of leading English
decisions on this point. Ames, Tort Because of Wrongful Motive, 18
Harvard Law Review 411, 412,--"The question whether there was or was
not just cause will depend, in many cases, but not in all, upon the motive
of the actor." In other words, motive goes to the justification and not
to the gist of the action. See semble, 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability, 344, et seq.
'5Gonzales v. Reichenthaler, (1921) 189 N. Y. S. 783; Twitchell v. Glen-
wood-Inglewood Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 375, 155 N. W. 621; Chapin, 1
New Jersey Law Review 160; 49 Solicitor's Journal 666.
'
8 Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, (1913) 120 Md. 381, 87 At.
927; Rice et al. v. Manley, (1876) 66 N. Y. 82, 23 Am. Rep. 30; Bigelow,
Torts, 8th Ed., p. 265.
"7Another arbitrary exception to the rule made by some courts is the
case of inducing breach of a contract of engagement to marry. Homan v.
Hall, (1917) 102 Neb. 70, 165 N. W. 881; Guida v. Pontrelli, (1921) 186
N. Y. S. 147. It is submitted that the rule should be the same as in other
NOTES
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-INTENT AS DETERMINING CHAR-
ACTER OF SHIPMENT.--In determining whether an article is sub-
ject to state or federal control, it often is important to determine
the exact point of time at which interstate commerce in the article
begins. The leading case on this subject is Coe v. Errol,' in
which the Supreme Court of the United States said that the in-
terstate character is not assumed until the goods are committed
to the common carrier for transportation out of the state.
However, when once delivered to the common carrier for
shipment, if a foreign destination is contemplated, the goods are
subjects of interstate commerce even though shipped on a local
bill of lading between two points in the same state. The court
of appeals of Maryland, in a recent case,2 stated the rule as fol-
lows:
"The intention as to destination with which the goods are de-
livered and accepted for conveyance by the carrier is held to
be the determining factor in such a problem. Whether or not in
a particular case the bill of lading discloses that the shipment is
for export, if that was the real design with which it was started
on the course of its transportation, and if it would proceed to a
foreign destination as the normal result of the movement thus
originated, it must be regarded and classified as foreign commerce."
The intent of the shipper as to the destination of the goods
is thus material in determining the interstate character of the
goods, after they have once been delivered to a carrier for ship-
ment. Is the intent of the shipper or purchaser, previous to de-
livery to the carrier, material?
contracts. Privilege should be held sufficient justification in some cases.
As to what a court must consider in deciding on the sufficiency of the
justification, see the language of Romer, L. J., in Glamorgan Coal Co. v.
South Wales Miners' Fed., [1903] 2 K. B. 545, 574, 52 W. R. 165. See
also note, 3 Virginia Law Review 385.
1(1886) 116 U. S. 517, 525, 6 S. C. R. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715. The court
states: "There must be a point of time when they [the goods] cease to
be governed exclusively by the domestic law and begin to be governed
and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that
moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose in which they
commence their final movement for transportation from the state of their
origin to that of their destination. When the products of the farm or the
forest are collected and brought in from the surrounding country to a
town or station serving as an entrep6t for that particular region, whether
on a river or a line of railroad, such products are not yet exports, nor are
they in process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are
committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the state to the
state of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that
state"'
2Fahey et al. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1921) 139 Md. 161, 114 Atl. 905,
following Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 11, 33
S. C. R. 229, 57 L. Ed. 442, and Railroad Com. of Louisiana v. Texas and
Pac. Ry., (1913) 229 U. S. 336, 33 S. C. R. 837, 57 L. Ed. 1215.
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It has been held that the manufacture of goods for the pur-
pose of interstate trade is not a part of interstate commerce.3
So also brokerage agreements for sales on commission, where
the goods are intended for interstate trade, are not a part of
interstate commerce but merely incidents thereof. 4 In the case
of In re Conicuh, etc., Co.,5 it was held that the fact that the
buyer of lumber, at the time of purchasing, intended to sell the
lumber so purchased only to persons in other states did not ren-
der the transaction one in interstate commerce. The right of a
state to tax the goods does not end until they are actually deliv-
ered to the carrier for shipment.6 In all these cases, the intent of
the shipper previous to the actual delivery of the goods to the car-
rier has no effect on the interstate character of the goods.
The circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit, in a recent case7
decided that a purchase of grain by an elevator in North Dakota
from a farmer of that state is a part of interstate commerce, and
accordingly held that a statute of North Dakota providing for the
grading of grain and the licensing of persons buying grain was
unconstitutional as imposing a direct burden on interstate com-
merce. In view of the cases cited above, the decision could not be
supported merely on the ground that the purchaser bought the
grain with the intent to ship it out of the state. The lower court
gave this as its reason for holding the purchase not a part of in-
terstate commerce. But on appeal, the decision was reversed, not
on the ground of intent, but on the ground that since ninety per
cent of the grain annually raised in North Dakota must be and
is purchased for shipment out of the state, such course of com-
merce is a fact and not a matter of intention. 8 The court cited the
case of Brozwm v. Maryland to the effect that a sale of goods
3United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, 15 S. C. R. 249,
39 L. Ed. 325; Kidd v. Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S. 1, 9 S. C. R. 6, 32 L. Ed.
346; Crescent Cotton 0. C. Co. v. Mississippi, (1921) 42 S. R. C. 42.4Hopkins v. United States, (1898) 171 U. S. 578, 19 S. C. R. 40, 43 L.
Ed. 290; State ex rel. Beek v. Wagener, (1889) 77 Minn. 483, 500, 80 N.
W. 633, 77 A. S. R. 681, 46 L. R. A. 442; State v. Edwards, (1905) 94
Minn. 225, 102 N. W. 697.
5(1910) 180 Fed. 249. See also Brunner v. Mobile & Gulfport Lumber
Co., (1914) 188 Ala. 248, 66 So. 438.6Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U. S. 517, 6 S. C. R. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715.
7Farmers Grain Co. of Embden v. Langer, (1921) 273 Fed. 635.8
"Where a substantial part of a business is interstate commerce, the
imposition of burdens and regulations thereon by state action cannot be
justified by the fact that a portion of the business thus sought to be con-
trolled and regulated is intrastate." Landon v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, (1917) 242 Fed. 658, 688.
9(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 446-447, 6 L. Ed. 678, Marshall, C. J.
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within a state after their transportation into that state was a part
of interstate commerce, and said that it could see no logical dis-
inction between a sale following transportation and a purchase
preceding it.10 It is difficult to justify the decision on any estab-
lished rule of law. The decision extends the broad construction
of the commerce clause of the federal constitution to a case not
heretofore considered as a part of interstate commerce.
RAILWAY BONDS-AUTHORITY To ISSUE-JURISDICTION OF
STATE CoMmIssIoN.-A fresh example of the intimate relation
of the railroads to the government and business of the country is
furnished by the joint issue of Great Northern-Northern Pacific
fifteen year convertible gold bonds designed to retire the Bur-
lington purchase bonds. This issue was authorized by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission and the business caution which
is the order of the day has drawn the attention of lawyers in
this state to the effect of such authorization upon the jurisdiction
of the Minnesota State Securities Commission over such issues.
The securities in question are not exempt from the operation
of the Minnesota Securities Act,1 by virtue of an express provision,
therein. Section 2 (c) of our securities act provides that:
"The provisions of this act, except section 10 thereof, shall
not apply to . . . securities of public or quasi public corpora-
tions, the issue of which securities is regulated by a public serv-
ice commission of this state or of any state or territory of the
United States, or securities senior thereto."
The only portion of this section which might be construed
as applicable to securities approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission is the clause "securities senior thereto." Are se-
curities regulated by a public service commission of the federal
government senior to securities regulated by the states and ter-
ritories? It is submitted that the legislative meaning of senior
was the ordinarily accepted one: securities which are a prior lien
10 Swift v. United States, (1905),196 U. S. 375, 398, 25 S. C. R. 276, 49
L. Ed. 518. Here the court said, 'commerce among the states is not a
technical legal conception but a practical one drawn from the course of
business." Also Savage v. Jones, (1912) 225 U. S. 501, 520, 32 S. C. R.
715, 56 L. Ed. 1182. In Heyman v. Hays, (1915) 236 U. S. 178, 186, 35
S. C. R. 403, 59 L. Ed. 527, the court said, "The protection against the im-
position of direct burdens upon the right to do interstate commerce is not
a mere abstraction affording no real protection but is practical and sub-
stantial and embraces those acts which are necessary to the complete en-joyment of the right protected."
'Minn. Laws, ch. 429, 1917, as amended.
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on the assets of the issuing company, or, in other words, securi-
ties which are "senior" in the sense that a first mortgage on real
estate is senior to a second mortgage. If that interpretation is
correct the clause would not operate to exempt securities ap-
proved by the Commerce Commission from the jurisdiction of
the Minnesota State Securities Commission.
Are the securities in question nevertheless exempt by virtue
of paramount law? The Interstate Commerce Act2 provides in
Title IV, sec. 439, sub-section 20 a (2) that:
"it shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of
capital stock or any bond or other evidence of interest in or in-
debtedness of the carrier (hereinafter in this section collectively
termed 'securities') . . . even though permitted by the author-
ity creating the carrier corporation, unless and until, and then
only to the extent that, upon application by the carrier, and after
investigation by the Commission of the purposes and uses of
the proposed issue and the proceeds thereof . . . the Commis-
sion by order authorizes such issue."
And in subdivision (7) of the same section and sub-section it
is provided that:
"The jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by this sec-
tion shall be exclusive and plenary, and a carrier may issue se-
curities and assume obligations or liabilities in accordance with
the provisions of this section without securing approval other
than as specified herein."
In terms the federal act clearly relieves the states of jurisdic-
tion.
May the Minnesota State Securities Commission nevertheless
exercise jurisdiction over the securities in question by virtue of
the police power . The securities act rests upon the exercise of
police power for the protection of our citizens. Under the po-
lice power the states may impose certain regulations on interstate
carriers, even though such regulations incidentally affect inter-
state commerce.3 Thus for example, Minnesota may restrict the
speed of interstate trains, while traveling in this state, to forty
miles per hour, and not only protect the health and safety of its
people but serve their convenience by requiring the carrier to
stop all passenger trains at all county seats to receive and de-
posit passengers.4 If, however, the federal Congress has under-
taken to regulate a subject matter over which its jurisdiction is
241 Stat. at L. 494.
sLake Shore, etc., Ry. v. Ohio, (1899) 173 U. S. 285, 19 S. C. R. 465,
43 L. Ed. 702; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., (1917) 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. C. R.
217, 61 L. Ed. 480; Elliott, The Annotated Blue Sky Laws of the U. S. 15.4Gladson v. Minn., (1897) 166 U. S. 427, 17 S. C. R. 627, 41 L. Ed. 1064.
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co-extensive or paramount, the authority of the state is terminat-
ed and it is ousted of jurisdiction.5 Upon that principle federal
exercise of war powers was deemed to abrogate state legislation
so far as it was co-extensive ;6 and similarly it is believed that con-
gressional action in the exclusively federal field of interstate com-
merce relieves the states of jurisdiction over the securities there-
by subjected to federal control.7
RECENT CASES
ADOPTION - DEATH OF ADOPTED CHILD - RIGHT OF NATURAL AND
ADOPTIVE PARENTS TO INHERT.-The decedent died intestate survived by
neither wife nor issue but by his adoptive parents and natural mother. Held,
that in the absence of statute, his surviving parents by nature and by adop-
tion inherit in equal proportion; and that one-third of the property should
be distributed to each of the three survivors. Baird v. Yates, (1921) 108
Kan. 721, 196 Pac. 1077, 200 Pac. 280.
The court argues in the instant case that since, in the absence of statute,
an adopted child will inherit from both its natural and adoptive parents, the
right must be reciprocal. In the absence of statute, there are several
views on the question of inheritance from an adopted child. The older
view is that the child's natural parents only are entitled to his property,
because, on a strict construction of the statute of descent, "inheritance"
connotes the next of kin by blood of the deceased. Edwards v. Yearby,
(1915) 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19, L. R. A. 1915E 462; Heidcamp v. Jersey
City St. Ry. Co., (1903) 69 N. J. L. 284, 55 Atl. 239, 101 A. S. R. 707; Hole
v. Robbins, (1881) 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617; White v. Dotter, (1904) 73
Ark. 130, 83 S. W. 1052. Some courts limit this rule by holding that
where the adopted child had derived the property by gift or inheritance
from an adoptive parent, it will go to the surviving adoptive parent.
Humphries v. Davis, (1884) 100 Ind. 274; La!ermnan v. Vanaile, (1912)
150 Ky. 751, 150 S. W. 1008, Ann. Cas. 1914D 563, or, under a statute, to
"the persons who would have been his kindred, if he had been born to his
adopting parent in lawful wedlock," MacMaster v. Fobe, (1917) 226
Mass. 396, 115 N. E. 487. Under statutes, however, providing that after
adoption the two shall sustain the legal relation of parent and child with
all the rights and duties of such relation, that the adoptive parent must
give the child support and education, and that the natural parents are
absolved from all duties and responsibilities, the more recent cases permit
the adoptive parent to inherit to the exclusion of the natural parent.
Havsgord v. Sverson, (1914) 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378; Estate of
5Lake Shore, etc., Ry. v. Ohio, (1899) 173 U. S. 285, 19 S. C. R. 465, 43
L. Ed. 702.
6Konkel v. State, (1919) 168 Wis. 335, 170 N. W. 715; see 4 MINNESOTA
LAW REvIEW 353, 358.71n an opinion dated May 3, 1921, the Attorney General of Minnesota
reached a similar conclusion.
